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The filing of an antitrust suit by Major League Soccer ("MLS")
players against MIS was viewed as a rite of passage for the new
league.2 After all, every established major professional sports league
has been sued for alleged violations of the antitrust laws for practices
relating to league rules concerning everything from franchise reloca-
tion to the wages of practice squad players.3 The importance of Fraser
v. MLS for the future of professional sports leagues, however, tran-
scends the continuing legality of the MLS regulations challenged in
the suit. Fraser is momentous because it is the first antitrust challenge
t B.A. 1992, Amherst College; M.S. 1997, University of Massachusetts;J.D. Candi-
date 2000, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to express my appreciation to Pro-
fessors Glenn Wong, Lisa Pike Masteralexis, and Edward Rock. I would also like to
thank Kirstin Thorne, Bill andJane Mathias, and Thomas Rapisarda for their support.
'The court adjudicating the lawsuit has already issued one ruling on pre-trial mo-
tions made by the litigants. The motions concerned the legality of MLS's transfer fee
arrangement with Federacion Internationale de Football Associacion ("FIFA"), the
sport's international governing body. The arrangement requires any soccer league
seeking to procure the services of a MLS player to pay MLS a fee, even if the player's
MLS contract has expired. SeeFraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 7 F. Supp. 2d 73,
79 (D. Mass. 1998) (denying parties' cross-motions for summary judgment regarding
MLS's transfer fee rule). The opinion did not address the single entity issue, the piv-
otal legal issue in the pending litigation and the focus of this Comment.
5After hearing of the lawsuit, NBA Commissioner David Stern reportedly told MLS
Commissioner Doug Logan, "Congratulations, you've finally arrived." Michael Rosen-
thal, MLS Raises Expectations, L.A. DAILYNEWS, Mar. 19, 1997, at S4.
3 See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (defining the extent of
the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)
(reaffirming baseball's antitrust exemption); NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust did not expire
when parties engaged in collective bargaining reached impasse); San Francisco Seals v.
NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (dismissing a hockey team's antitrust claim
against its league).
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to a "single entity league," a league that is organized as a single corpo-
ration rather than as a group of individually owned teams.4
MLS's single entity structure was designed to insulate the league
from one form of antitrust liability under the Sherman Act.5 The
league is structured as a single corporation, which wholly owns all of
the teams that compete in the league. "The Sherman Act contains a
'basic distinction between concerted and independent action."' Most
antitrust challenges to the established leagues have been brought un-
der section 1 of the Sherman Act ("section 1"), which only applies to
concerted action between two economic actors: "It does not reach
conduct that is 'wholly unilateral.'" 7 The actions of a single corpora-
tion are only regulated by section 2 of the Sherman Act ("section 2"),
which prohibits monopolization or attempted monopolization of
trade.8 It is MLS's legal position that, as a single corporation, it can-
not "combine, contract, or conspire" with itself, and therefore its in-
ternal league practices are not actionable under section 1. Should the
court(s) accept MLS's argument, single entity leagues will have a sig-
nificant advantage in their labor relations relative to other leagues.9
This advantage will encourage newly forming leagues to follow MLS's
example and organize as single entities. Perhaps even more signifi-
candy, an MLS legal victory may induce more established leagues to
reorganize themselves as single entities.
Aside from facilitating the formation of new professional sports
leagues, there are no compelling policy reasons for treating MLS as a
single entity. Although it may be easy to sympathize with the players'
desire to earn what might seem to be their true market value, the
players as individual economic entities have little market value. It is
only in the context of a competitive league, provided by MLS investors
risking millions of dollars in losses, that the players' skills become
4 See Denise Kiernan, MLS: Living Single?, TE VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 30, 1997, at
133 (discussing "MLS's trailblazing single-entity structure").
5 See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 186 (2d ed. 1998)
(discussing the reasons MLS structured itself as a single corporation).
6Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) (quot-
ing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)).7 Id. at 768 (quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
8 See Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) ("Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony....").
9 The players would not be able to bring a section 1 claim against the league, thus
removing an important bargaining chip. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the
effect of a dismissal of a section 1 claim in light of the low likelihood of success on a
section 2 claim).
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valuable. Furthermore, although MLS labor restraints may hold down
salaries of players already in the league, a profitable league is likely to
expand and thus provide employment opportunities for more players.
Despite the lack of policy concerns, the players' suit is significant
because it will force the courts to consider how economic coadventur-
ers who retain some minimally disparate economic interests should be
treated under the antitrust laws. The courts' response to this question
may have a considerable effect on both traditionally organized leagues
and non-sports joint ventures that require cooperation among eco-
nomic competitors.
This Comment explores the implications of a victory for MLS in
its current litigation with its players. Part I examines the reasons a
professional sports league should be concerned with antitrust law, and
the history of the single entity question as it relates to the more "tradi-
tional" league model.'0 Part II compares the various single entity
models in existence and analyzes the potential arguments of the Fraser
litigants. It concludes, on the strength of its legal arguments, that
MLS should be considered a single entity for section 1 purposes, thus
rendering intraleague rules immune from section 1 scrutiny. Part III
discusses the viability of a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act
against a single entity league, which may limit the extent to which
MLS and other single entity leagues are shielded from antitrust scru-
tiny. Part IV explores the possibility of established, traditionally or-
ganized leagues restructuring themselves as single entities and sug-
gests one possible plan to accomplish such a reorganization.
I. ANTITRUST LAW, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES, AND
THE SINGLE ENTITY QUESTION
A. Antitrust Law
Antitrust law regulates the conduct of economic actors. Defen-
dants who violate the Sherman Act are liable for treble damages."
Therefore, Sherman Act violators may incur enormous liability for
their anticompetitive behavior. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohib-
its "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in the restraint of
'0 The National Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey
League, and Major League Baseball are all organized similarly. See discussion infra Part
.C (discussing the traditional professional sports league model).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
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trade or commerce .... The actions of a single economic entity are
not subject to section 1 scrutiny because section 1 requires an agree-
ment between at least two independent economic actors, commonly
called "concerted action," to satisfy the statute's "contract, combina-
tion ... or conspiracy" requirement. 3  Concerted action is assessed
under section 1 under two "complementary categories of antitrust
analysis." 14 Those restraints of trade that have no competitive benefits
are declared illegal per se.15 Such restraints include price fixing,
group boycotts, and horizontal market division. More commonly, re-
straints are assessed under the rule of reason. Restraints subject to the
rule of reason violate section 1 only if the anticompetitive effects of a
particular agreement outweigh its procompetitive effects. The com-
petitive effects of these agreements "can only be evaluated by analyz-
ing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and
the reasons why it was imposed."
16
Section 2 of the Sherman Act applies to single firm conduct as
well as concerted action. A firm violates section 2 only when it holds
monopoly power in a particular market and engages in behavior that
constitutes an abuse of that monopoly power. The requirement that a
section 2 defendant possess monopoly power makes a section 2 claim
much more difficult to pursue than an action under section 1, which
has no such requirement.
B. Why Are Professional Sports Leagues
Concerned with Antitrust Law?
The Supreme Court noted in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Board of Regents that sports leagues and teams require a high level of
cooperation among competitors for their product to even exist.1 7 Uni-
form rules of play, restrictions on scheduling, and myriad other regu-
lations are necessary for college and professional teams to compete on
a reasonably level playing field. When sports teams within a league
1 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
:S Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
'National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
" SeeArizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (deeming
per se treatment appropriate "[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint
enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it").
16 National Soc y of Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
17 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) ("'When a [hypothetical] league of professional lacrosse
teams is formed, it would be pointless to declare their cooperation illegal on the
ground that there are no other professional lacrosse teams.'" (quoting ROBERT H.
BoRM, Ti3EANTITRusTPARADox278 (1978))).
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agree to certain restrictions, however, they necessarily exclude other
potential competitors, suppliers, and distributors of their product.
8
In other words, the restrictions are agreements in restraint of trade,
and, at least facially, violate section 1 of the Sherman Act 19
Just as agreements regarding the number of players who may par-
ticipate on the field of play are necessary to guarantee a level of com-
petitive balance on the field, leagues have attempted to ensure com-
petitive balance by implementing a variety of restrictions that also
interfere with players' ability to market their services. The player
draft, free agency restrictions, salary caps, and revenue sharing
agreements all restrict, to varying degrees, the wages players may earn.
The league practices at issue in Fraser are in many ways typical of the
type of restraints challenged by players under antitrust law. The stan-
dard MLS player contract gives the league the unilateral right to re-
new the contract, rather than allowing the player to sell his services to
20the highest bidder. MLS maintains a salary cap that sets the maxi-
mum amount any team may spend on player salaries. This cap is
somewhat redundant, however, as a single league official is responsi-
ble for negotiating all player contracts and thus has complete control
over each team's total salary.2 MLS also complies with the transfer fee
system created by Federacion Internationale de Football Associacion
("FIFA"), soccer's world governing body, which requires other leagues
to pay MLS for the rights to a player, even after the player's contract
has expired.2
Players' unions regard the threat of an antitrust suit as a signifi-
cant bargaining tool in negotiations with the leagues.2a However, a re-
8 For example, limiting the number of games that each team plays in a season lim-
its the supply of games that can be broadcast to the public by television networks. Al-
lowing teams to draft particular players limits those players' ability to market them-
selves in the labor supply market.
'9 The Sherman Act, however, has been interpreted to proscribe only unreasonable
restraints of trade. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) ("[I]t
was intended that the standard of reason.., be the measure used for the purpose of
determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the
wrong against which the statute provided."); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,
10 (1997) ("Although the Sherman Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement 'in re-
straint of trade,' this Court has long recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only
unreasonable restraints." (citation omitted)).
20 See MLS Players' Union iles Suit, Gannett News Service, Feb. 13, 1997, available in
1997 WL 8821935 (describing the standard MLS contract).
21 See idL (discussing MLS's salary policies).
'See id. (discussing the FIFA transfer fee system).
23 See WEMLER & ROBERTs, supra note 5, at 204 (noting that other players' unions'
inability to achieve their goals through the collective bargaining process led them to
pursue, in the alternative, antitrust challenges against their respective leagues).
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cent Supreme Court decision has limited the ability of players repre-
sented by unions to sue their respective leagues for antitrust viola-
tions. In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the Court held that agreements be-
tween a multi-employer bargaining unit and a labor union are exempt
from antitrust challenge until the "agreement among employers [is]
sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective
bargaining process."14 It is unclear exactly how long employees must
wait after renouncing the collective bargaining process before courts
will decide that an agreement meets Brown's "distant in time and cir-
cumstance" standard. Nevertheless, an antitrust suit does remain an
option for players lacking the bargaining leverage to achieve accept-
able hours, wages, and working conditions through the collective bar-
gaining process.
C. The Traditional Professional Sports League Model
Four sports leagues have traditionally dominated the national
market for team sports: the National Football League ("NFL"), Major
League Baseball ("MLB"), the National Basketball Association
("NBA"), and the National Hockey League ("NHL).25 Each of these
leagues exists as the product of a contractual agreement among its in-
dependently-owned member clubs, which compete against one an-
26other in their respective sports.
The member clubs, or franchises, vary widely in how they are or-
ganized. A franchise may be organized as a partnership, a privately
held corporation, or a publicly traded corporation, among other
forms. The leagues themselves are actually unincorporated, non-
profit associations governed by an elected commissioner and an ex-
ecutive committee.27 The contract among the franchises sets forth theprocedures by which league-wide rules are adopted and enforced, and
24 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
SeeWEELER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 468 (discussing "the four historically 'ma-
jor' sports").
See id. (analyzing the structure of the traditional leagues).
See Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The Commissioner
and an Alternative Approach from a Corporate Perspective 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65, 68-69
(1995) (describing the organization of the four major leagues). As a formal matter,
MLB is structured somewhat differently. The organization is divided into the Ameri-
can and National Leagues, both of which are completely independent leagues, each
with its own executive power. As a practical matter, however, the American and Na-
tional Leagues' power is delegated to the Commissioner's office and an Executive
Council, similar to the other leagues. See id. at 69.
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delegates powers to the central league office.28
D. Single Entity Theory and the Traditional Sports
League Model: Existing Case Law
The traditionally organized professional sports leagues have long
argued that they are in fact single entities, and that their practices are,
therefore, not subject to section 1 challenges that various league rules
tend to attract.2 The leagues "contend that a professional sports
league is a unique business, containing an unusual but necessary mix-
ture of interparticipant competition and cooperation not found in
any other kind of partnership or joint venture."30 Furthermore, they
argue that their teams are not competitors in a traditional business
sense, but instead are integral parts of a single entity. Although the
member clubs may be considered competitors by the public, which
focuses on the athletic competition (each league's product), in reality,
the actual outcomes of the athletic contests are irrelevant to the busi-
ness of the league. In the leagues' view, although the teams may
compete against one another for a player's services, this competition,
like that on the field, is strictly controlled by league rules that are en-
forced by the central league office, and therefore should be consid-
ered an internal business matter.1
The traditional leagues' position has received limited judicial ap-
probation. In one early case, San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, a federal
district court did hold that a professional hockey team could not sue
the league in which it competed under section I of the Sherman Act! 2
The Seals court stated that section 1 required "at least two independ-
ent business entities" and that in the production of professional
hockey games before live audiences in the United States and Canada,
"plaintiff and defendants are not competitors in the economic
sense.
"33
2' See it. at 68-69 (explaining the authority of the leagues' governing bodies).
See supra Part I.B (discusing why sports league rules give rise to antitrust claims).
" Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theoy:
A Deee of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 29 (1991).
See id. at 29, 31-32 (describing the traditional arguments raised by proponents of
the single entity defense, and emphasizing the "unique" nature of the intraleague
competition).2379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
I. at 969.
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1. Judicial Rejection of the Seals Approach:
Pre-Copperweld Cases
The single entity defense was rejected by the Second Circuit in
North American Soccer League v. NFL, in which the North American Soc-
cer League ("NASL") challenged the NFL's policy of prohibiting
football team owners from owning teams in other sports leagues un-
der section 1 of the Sherman Act!' The court concluded that charac-
terizing the NFL as a single entity would create an antitrust "loophole"
that could allow the league to adopt restraints to protect individual
franchise owners."" The NASL court also emphasized the economic
independence of the NFL's franchises:
[E]ach member [club] is a separately owned, discrete legal entity which
does not share its expenses, capital expenditures or profits with other
members .... [I]n spite of the sharing of some revenues, the financial
performance of each team, while related to that of the others, does not,
because of the variables in revenues and costs as between member teams,
necessarily rise or fall with that of the others.4
Arguably, the Second Circuit's rationale values form over sub-
stance. Although each team is organized as a separate, independently-
owned entity, the NFL teams could also be viewed as acting as a single
corporate board of directors in promulgating the cross-ownership
ban. 7 Additionally, the court understates the economic interdepend-
ence of the franchises in stating that the teams share "some" revenues.
In fact, when NASL was decided, NFL teams shared 90% of League
38revenues.
3 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-57 (2d Cir. 1982).
-" See id. at 1257 ("To tolerate such a loophole would permit league members to
escape antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would benefit
their league or enhance their ability to compete even though the benefit would be
outweighed by its anticompetitive effects."). This ignores the possibility of a section 2
claim, which has been viewed as a backstop to prevent enterprises from evading anti-
trust scrutiny altogether. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1910)
("[A] consideration of the text of the second section serves to establish that it was in-
tended to supplement the first and to make sure that by no possible guise could the
public policy embodied in the first section be frustrated or evaded."). As section 2 ap-
plies to single firm conduct, sports leagues would still be subject to antitrust law.
North Am. SoccerLeague, 670 F.2d at 1252.
37 The Seventh Circuit implicitly adopted this view in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd.
Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1996) ("WGN').
See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir.
1984) ("Raiders") ("[A] large portion of League revenue, approximately 90%, is di-
vided equally among the teams .... ").
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Soon after the NASL decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected the sin-
gle entity defense in a suit brought by the Los Angeles Raiders and the
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com-
mision v. NFL ("Raiders").39 The suit challenged the NFL's efforts to
block the Raiders' move from Oakland to Los Angeles.0 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the trial court, holding that, as a matter of law, the
NFL was not a single entity.4' The court based its decision on three
main reasons:
Initially, the [district] court recognized the logical extension of [the sin-
gle entity] argument was to make the League incapable of violating
Sherman Act § 1 in every other subject restriction-yet courts have held
the League violated § 1 in other areas. Secondly, other organizations
have been found to violate § 1 though their product was "just as uni-
tary... and requires the same kind of cooperation from the organiza-
tion's members." Finally, the district court considered the argument to
be based upon the false premise that the individual NFL "clubs are not
separate business entities whose products have independent value."
42
First, the court claimed that because other courts had found the
League to have violated section 1, it must therefore be subject to sec-
tion 1.4 The other decisions cited by the court were the NASL case,
and three decisions involving NFL rules concerning player contracts:
Smith v. Pro Football, Ina,44 Mackey v. NFL,5 and Kapp v. NFL.46 The
Ninth Circuit's reliance on the latter three cases is extremely ques-
tionable. The NFL did not proffer a single entity defense in any of
those cases, so those courts simply did not consider the issue. There-
fore, the precedents on which the Raiders court relied were not par-
ticularly persuasive, even though the aforementioned courts could
"' See id. at 1390 (affirming the district court's rejection of the NFL's single entity
defense).4 0 See id. at 1385 (describing the events preceding the litigation).
4, See id at 1387 (holding that, based on the undisputed facts, the district court cor-
rectY directed a verdict for the plaintiffs).
Id. at 1387-88 (citations omitted).
See id. at 1388 ("[The logical extension of [the single entity] argument was to
make the League incapable of violating Sherman Act § 1 in every other subject restric-
tion-yet courts have held the League violated § 1 in other areas.").
44 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (challenging the legality of the NFL's player selec-
tionprocess, commonly called the draft).
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (challenging the NFL's rule allowing the league
commissioner to require a club acquiring a free agent to compensate the free agent's
former club).
16 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978) (challenging, among other things, the legality of the
NFL mandate that all players must sign a Standard Players' Contract which binds play-
ers to the NFL constitution and bylaws).
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have looked outside the parties' arguments to decide the cases on a
single entity-based rationale.
In its discussion of precedent, the Raiders court completely ig-
nored Seals, despite its seemingly direct application to the issue. In-
stead, the Ninth Circuit relegated the Seals opinion to a footnote in its
conclusion and rejected the single entity defense, stating that while
Seals was "persuasive," "existing precedent [could not] be ignored.
4 7
As "existing precedent" in reality consisted of a single Second Circuit
opinion, this portion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning appears to be
profoundly unconvincing.
Second, the Raiders court reasoned that the NFL was similar to
other businesses shown to be subject to section 1. The court noted
the existence of a Ninth Circuit exception to the finding of concerted
action where "'multiple corporations [are] operated as a single entity'
when 'corporate policies are set by one individual or by a parent cor-
poration. ,48 The NFL was not covered by this exception, however,
because "NFL policies are not set by one individual or parent corpora-
tion, but by the separate teams acting jointly." 9 The Seventh Circuit
implicitly rejected this logic in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partner-
ship v. NBA by embracing the "corporate board" analogy, which views
the clubs as members of a corporate board controlling league policy.!
It is not inaccurate to characterize a league as either "separate teams
acting jointly" or as a single firm controlled by a board of directors,
which is in part why courts willing to give the single entity argument
its due consideration have struggled a great deal to reach a conclu-
sion.
In rendering its holding, the Raiders court cited three well known
cases in which concerted action was found even though, as is the case
with a professional sports league, cooperation was necessary to pro-
duce the product:5' Associated Press v. United States,52 Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System, Inc., ("BI) 55 and United States v.
47 Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1390 n.4.
4' Id. at 1388 (quoting General Bus. Sys. v. North Ar. Phillips Corp., 699 F.2d 965,
980 (9th Cir. 1983)).
49 Id. at 1389.
5095 F.3d 593, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1996) ("WGN').
See Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1389 (discussing the relevance of the three cases).
52 326 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1945) (holding that the cooperative nature of the enterprise
did not make the defendant immune to section 1 liability).
'" 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (applying rule of reason analysis to blanket license offered by
license holder of copyrighted songs).
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Sealy, Inc.4 Despite the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Raiders, these
cases are actually distinguishable because in each, the defendant in-
dependent firm had a viable product that did not require cooperation
with competitors, but chose to cooperate with competitors to produce
a second product. The cooperation was not necessary to the defen-
dants' core business in those cases, only to the additional joint ven-
ture. Members of a professional sports league have no alternative but
to cooperate with fellow members. The bedding manufacturers in
Sealy, for example, could have simply continued to manufacture their
own mattresses rather than form ajoint venture with competitors; co-
operation was not absolutely essential to the continued vitality of each
individual manufacturer's operations. An NFL team, by contrast, has
no product to offer if it does not cooperate with others.55 It could be
argued that the facts of BMA are sufficiently analogous because the in-
ability of individual license holders to protect their rights from in-
fringement made the license essentially worthless by itself; only by
combining with other license holders did the license hold value. The
BMI court assumed, nevertheless, without discussion, that the groups
of individual license holders were combinations for antitrust pur-
poses.! BMT was decided five years before Copperweld,5 7 however, and
if the case was reargued in light of Copperweld, it is possible that the
court might have accepted a single entity argument.
Third, the Raiders court refused to accept the NFL's argument
that its teams were not "'separate business entities whose products
have an independent value.' 'g The court discounted the cooperation
necessary to produce a football game because a team could play out-
side of the league.59 The value of such an undertaking, however, es-
pecially over the long term, is so small in proportion to the value real-
ized by a team competing in the NFL that it makes the court's
argument entirely unconvincing.O Although the court's independent
-" 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (finding that the joint venture among bedding manufactur-
ers violated section 1).
5 As the Seventh Circuit noted in WGN, "a league with one team would be like one
hand clapping." WGN, 95 F.3d at 598-99.
See BM, 441 U.S. at 7-9.
57 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984);seesupra
text accompanying notes 62-64.53 Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1388 (citation omitted).
59 See id. at 1390 (arguing that teams could play outside of the NFL).
The NFL's Washington Redskins were recently sold for a reported $800 million.
See Adrienne T. Washington, Bully Turns Benefactor in $800 Million Stroke, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1999, at C2 (discussing the sale of the team). If the Redskins had announced
before the sale of the franchise that the team would no longer compete in the NFL,
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value claim is somewhat understandable given the existence at the
time of the United States Football League, which a NFL team could
theoretically have joined, the likelihood of such a defection in reality
was extremely small.6 ' By contrast, the independent value of the
products made by the defendants in Associated Press, BM[, and Sealy
were not based on a court's whimsical speculation, but instead on
their demonstrated performance in the marketplace. Therefore, such
a comparison is inappropriate.
2. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.
Soon after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Raiders, the Supreme
Court issued a factually distinguishable decision that nonetheless
could be viewed as supporting the NFL's single entity argument. In
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the Court overturned the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, which provided that agreements
within corporations, usually between a parent corporation and its sub-
sidiary, satisfied the section 1 conspiracy requirement.62 Instead, the
Copperweld Court held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiaries constituted a single firm for antitrust purposes and were
thus exempt from section 1.63 The Court's approach to the concerted
action requirement discounted the importance of an entity's eco-
nomic form, and instead instructed courts to look at the economic re-
ality of the business's structure.6 To proponents of the professional
league's single entity argument, this new emphasis on reality over
form urged a reconsideration of the single entity claim.
3. Post-Copperweld Case Law
In the wake of the Copperweld decision, however, the courts have
generally followed Raiders and distinguished Copperweld, rather than
finding Copperweld sufficiently analogous to dismiss section 1 claims
but would instead arrange exhibition games with whatever teams they could schedule,
the team's value would have plummeted.
61 The failure of any team in one of the four major professional leagues to defect to
another league speaks to the economic irrationality of such a move.
62 467 U.S. 752, 772-73 (1984) ("Because there is nothing inherently anticompeti-
tive about a corporation's decision to create a subsidiary, the intra-enterprise conspir-
acy doctrine 'imposes grave legal consequences upon organizational distinctions that
are of de minimis meaning and effect.'") (citations omitted).
See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 776 ("[W]e can only conclude that the coordinated
behavior of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary falls outside the reach of [section
1].").
See id. at 772 (rejecting the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine because it "looks
to the form of an enterprise's structure and ignores the reality").
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against the professional leagues. In Sullivan v. NFL, the First Circuit
stated that "the critical inquiry is whether the alleged antitrust con-
spirators have a 'unity of interests' or whether, instead, 'any of the de-
fendants has pursued interests diverse from those of the cooperative
itsef."6 The Sullivan court found that NFL teams compete with one
another "for things like fan support, players, coaches, ticket sales, lo-
cal broadcast revenues, and the sale of team paraphemalia."6 Due to
the existence of this off-field competition, the teams did have "diverse
interests," and thus failed the latter part of the "unity of interests"
standard.67 As a result, the Sullivan court held that NFL teams were
not a single entity for section 1 purposes.68
The Sullivan court purported to adopt the standard for interpret-
ing Copperweld set forth in City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Electric Coop-
erative, Inc. ("Mt. Pleasant").69 In Mt. Pleasant, ajoint venture that sup-
plied electricity to rural communities was found by the court to be a
single entity. 7' The Associate Electric Cooperative featured an elabo-
rate three-tiered ownership structure. It was owned by six generation
and transmission cooperatives, which in turn were owned by forty-
three distribution companies. These distribution companies' custom-
ers-425,000 individual consumers-owned the distribution compa-
nies. 7' Therefore, the decision-making power within the Cooperative
was, as a formal matter, diffused widely among a variety of separately
owned economic entities.
Although the First Circuit in Sullivan and the Eighth Circuit in Mt.
Pleasant agreed on the same legal standard to use, they applied that
34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated
Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 274-77 (8th Cir. 1988)). This approach was criticized
by the Seventh Circuit in WGN.
Although [the complete unity of interests] phrase appears in Copperve/ the
Court offered it as a statement of fact about the parent-subsidiary relation, not
as a proposition of law about the limits of permissible cooperation. As a
proposition of law, itwould be silly. Even a single firm contains many compet-
ing interests.
Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996)
("WGN").
Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1098.
6 See id. at 1099 ("NFL member clubs compete in several ways off the field, which
itself tends to show that the teams pursue diverse interests and thus are not a single
enterprise under § 1.").
63 id.
0 Mt. Pleasant, 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988).
7' See id. at 271 (describing the complicated ownership and supply structure of the
cooperative).
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standard in very different ways. Much like the plaintiff in Sullivan, the
petitioner in Mt. Pleasant argued that the cooperative members had
diverse economic interests because they competed for customers, in-
cluding municipal customers, were forced to arbitrate a dispute con-
cerning rate structures, and disagreed over how to divide the coopera-
tive's profits.n The court found that this evidence proved that the
cooperative members had diverse economic interests, but "not in the
sense necessary to create a fact issue on whether these companies are
part of a single enterprise. "73 The Mt. Pleasant court's discussion of
the intracooperative competition is notable because it focused much
more on the overall purpose of the cooperative rather than on certain
areas in which cooperative members competed.
Even though the cooperatives may quarrel among themselves on how to
divide the spoils of their economic power, it cannot reasonably be said
that they are independent sources of that power. Their power depends, and
has always depended, on the cooperation among themselves.... The
disagreements we have described are more like those among the board
members of a single enterprise, than those among enterprises which are
themselves separate and independent
74
This analysis, when applied to a professional sports league, seems
to support a finding of single entity status. The NFL owners do func-
tion like "board members of a single enterprise" when they promul-
gate the league-wide rules that are at issue in antitrust claims against
the League.75 In addition, the League's economic success "depends,
and has always depended, on the cooperation among [the member
teams]." 76 In light of this language, and more significantly, the overall
reluctance of the Mt. Pleasant court to accept evidence of intracoop-
erative competition so as to create even an issue of fact, it is clear that
the Sullivan court interpreted Copperweld very differently than the Mt.
Pleasant court. Furthermore, it seems clear that an Eighth Circuit
court dutifully following Mt. Pleasant would have no choice but to hold
7 Id. at 276-77. In addition, the city argued that the cooperative members must
have competed in the labor market, see id. at 277, a factor the Sullivan court found very
persuasive in ruling that the NFL failed to meet the unity of interests standard, see Sul-
livan, 34 F.3d at 1098-99.
73 M. Pleasant, 838 F.2d at 277. The procedural posture of this case further points
to the difference between the standards of the First and the Eighth Circuits. The Mi.
Pleasant petitioners merely had to show that there was a triable issue of fact regarding




that a professional sports league is a single entity.
Nevertheless, in an unpublished opinion, a district court in the
Eighth Circuit reached the same outcome as the Sullivan court by ap-
plying a different legal principle. In reviewing that trial court's deci-
sion, the Eighth Circuit in St. Louis Convention &? Visitors Commission v.
NFL noted that the district court found that the league was estopped
from arguing that its teams comprised a single economic entity be-
cause of the Ninth Circuit decision in Raiders.77 The trial court also
found that neither Copperweld nor Mt. Pleasant necessitated that it re-
consider the league's single entity argument.78 The district court did
dismiss the case during the course of the trial, however, because of in-
sufficient evidence.n The Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
dismissal, and therefore did not address the NFL's cross-appeal on the
single entity question.s°
Much of the leading case law demonstrates the courts' hostility to
the single entity argument, but a Seventh Circuit case, Chicago Profes-
sional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA ("WGI'), suggests that the majority
view has not necessarily gained a consensus and that the single entity
question with regard to traditionally organized sports leagues remains
an undecided one."' In WGN, the trial court ruled that the NBA was
not a single entity because its teams did not have a "complete unity of
interest."u The Seventh Circuit vacated that holding and remanded
the case for further consideration.? The Seventh Circuit agreed with
the trial court's holding that NBA teams did not have a "complete
154 F.3d 851, 856 (8th Cir. 1998) (recounting the trial court's findings).
See id. ("The district court was not persuaded that two subsequent cases [(Copper-
weld and Mt. Pleasant)] dealing with the concept of single economic enterprise re-
quired a different result.").
See id. at 859 ("Since the court concluded that [the plaintiff] had presented no
evidence to show that the NFL's rule and the guidelines actually had caused league
teams other than the Rams to refrain from competitive bidding on the Trans World
'Dome lease, it granted the Rule 50 motion.").
'0 See id. at 865 n.9 (dismissing the NFL's cross-appeal of the trial court's single en-
tity ruling).
8'95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).82 Id. at 597. The case involved a dispute between the plaintiffs, the Chicago Bulls
basketball team and WGN, a cable television station, and the defendant NBA, over how
many Bulls games WGN was permitted to broadcast each basketball season. See id. at
595 (explaining that both sides have appealed the trial court's 30 game allowance, with
the Bulls and WGN wanting to broadcast 41 games per year, and the NBA seeking to
fix the number between 15 to 20). The league argued that the broadcasts infringed on
the rights of other cable stations that had contracted with the NBA for rights to televise
games nationally.
s See id. at 601 (vacating the district court's judgment of "all events" and remand-
ing).
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unity of interest," but held that such a determination was not neces-
sarily dispositive of the single entity question84 The court did not in-
terpret Copperweld to "hold that only conflict-free enterprises may be
treated as single entities. "m After all, the court noted, "multi-stage"
firms such as General Motors or IBM often have conflicts between
various departments." 8 According to the WGN court, Copperweld held
that the concerted action requirement exists to scrutinize "[c] onduct
that 'deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decision-
making that competition assumes.'" 7  In Copperweld, the parent-
subsidiary relationship did not deprive the marketplace and, there-
fore, was not subject to section 1 scrutiny.
Applying this interpretation, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[w]e
see no reason why a sports league cannot be treated as a single firm in
this typology. " 8 The court stopped short, however, of declaring the
NBA a single entity. In remanding the case, the court stated that the
single entity question requires a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of
the league. The WGN court argued that it is entirely possible for one
league (the NBA, for example) to be characterized as a single entity
and for another league (the NHL, for example) to be subject to the
Rule of Reason. 9 Furthermore, separate aspects of league decision-
making may be characterized differently. The WGNcourt stated:
[W] e do not rule out the possibility that an organization such as the NBA
is best understood as one firm when selling broadcast rights to a network
in competition with a thousand other producers of entertainment, but is
best understood as a joint venture when curtailing competition for play-
ers who have few other market opportunities.90
The standard set forth by the WGNcourt effectively articulates why
the single entity question is so difficult, but fails to answer satisfactorily
how professional sports leagues ought to be characterized. The "de-
priving the marketplace of independent centers of decision-making"
standard fails to give much guidance to the trial courts that must actu-
ally make such determinations. Furthermore, it requires in each in-
841 d. at 598.
a Id.
6 Id.
87 Id. (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769
(1984)).
8Id.
89 See id. at 600 ("Sports are sufficiently diverse that it is essential to investigate their
organization and ask Copperweld's functional question one league at a time....").
9Id.
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stance a fact-intensive review of the facets of a league's operation, as
well as comparison with other leagues and other business forms, to
reach a conclusion. These requirements, therefore, deny all parties
the efficiency benefits of a bright-line rule. An inquiry of this sort has
not yet taken place, as the parties in WGN reached a settlement after
the Seventh Circuit's decision was rendered.9'
A review of the case law concerning the traditional leagues' single
entity argument shows a prevailing hostility to the leagues' claim that
they constitute single economic units for antitrust purposes. Courts
have consistently followed the result reached by the court in Raiders,
notwithstanding the questionable rationale behind that decision. The
Seventh Circuit's WGN decision suggests, however, that the rule of
Raiders has not been universally accepted. The parameters of the de-
bate will undoubtedly influence the Fraser court's reasoning in affirm-
ing or denying MLS's single entity claim.
II. THE NEW PARADIGM: SINGLE ENTrTYLF-AGUES
The existing case law on the single entity question discussed in
Part I.C only directly applies to leagues organized according to the
traditional model as described in Part I.A. Partly in response to the
courts' generally hostile reaction to the established leagues' single en-
tity arguments, several upstart leagues have organized themselves as
single corporate entities.? Before evaluating the legal arguments
available to the litigants in Fraser v. AMS, it seems appropriate to heed
the Seventh Circuit's admonition.93 and examine the nature and prac-
tices of the league at issue, and compare its structure to those of fellow
single entity leagues.
A. Benefits of a Single Entity League
Given the history of repeated antitrust challenges to the tradi-
tional league practices described in Part I.B, any protection the
leagues can muster from antitrust scrutiny would benefit them con-
siderably. If the leagues are viewed as single entities, they could avoid
the potential of treble damages as well as the costs of litigation from
"See Lacy J. Banks, Fans Big Winners in NBA-WGN Settlement, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1996, at 7 (describing the effects of the settlement).
'2 See infra Part HA (discussing leagues organized as single entities).
93 See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
decision in WGN).
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suits arising under section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 Potential plaintiffs
would be forced to challenge league rules as abuses of monopoly
power under section 2 of the Sherman Act, a far more difficult claim
to prove. 95 The league would thus enhance its bargaining leverage
over its players' union because the union would be unable to threaten
the league with a section 1 lawsuit.96 The corporate structure of the
league would offer other advantages as well. The league can increase
the value of its sponsorship agreements by ensuring its league-wide
sponsors that individual clubs will not enter into sponsorship agree-
ments with competitor firms that dilute the value of the league-wide
sponsor's investment.97  The corporate league can also reduce the
number of decisions that require building a consensus among league
owners. By contracting to place league decision-making power in the
hands of the central league office, the corporate league can prevent
franchises from relocating, realign divisions, and otherwise make deci-
sions that serve the purposes of the league as a whole rather than in-
dividual owners." Finally, the league can achieve economies of scalethrough increased purchasing power.99
B. Organization of MajorLeague Soccer
MLS was initially designed by Los Angeles attorney Alan Rothen-
" The Sherman Act provides that successful plaintiffs may recover three times the
amount of their actual damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
" See infra Part III (discussing section 2 liability).
9 Although the leagues are protected from antitrust challenges by players' unions
under the non-statutory labor exemption, see WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 204,
it remains possible that a union could decertify and individual players, "sufficiently dis-
tant in time and circumstance" from the collective bargaining process, could bring suit
against a league. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (holding
that federal labor laws shield from antitrust attack an agreement among several em-
ployers bargaining together to implement the terms of their last best good-faith wage
offer, after reaching an impasse in bargaining with the players' union). In McNeil v.
NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992), the National Football League Players Associa-
tion decertified in order to bring suit against the NFL to challenge the League's "Plan
B" free agency rules, which ultimately resulted in a settlement that dramatically in-
creased the players' freedom of movement.
See Larry Lebowitz, Sports Inc.: Leagues Are Forming As "Single Entities" Where Deci-
sion and Profits Are Shared By All Owners, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Apr. 20,
1997, at IF (noting that the owners of the Dallas Cowboys and the New York Yankees
have signed sponsorship deals with companies that compete with official league-wide
sponsors).
See id. (explaining that the single entity model protects a league from the whims
and over-spending of an individual owner).
99 See id. (discussing how "single-entity ownership create[s] a lot of advantages in
negotiating broadcast rights and sponsorship deals").
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berg as a limited-liability Delaware corporation run by a Board of Di-
rectors appointed by league investors.0 Rothenberg planned that
MLS would own and operate all of the teams in the league, assign
players and team personnel, and set local ticket and concession prices.
League investors would merely own shares in MLS itself.'0 ' This struc-
ture effectively addressed the reasoning of the Sullivan court, which
rejected the NFL's single entity defense because NFL teams compete
off-field,' °2 by simply eliminating all forms of off-field competition.
The only competition possible in this model is in the form of the on-
field games themselves. In MLS's view, the games do not represent
competition in any economic sense, but rather represent the product
of the MLS corporation. It seems highly likely, therefore, that if MLS
had retained this structure, the players' section 1 claims in Fraser
would have been dismissed under Copperwel'
MLS was forced to modify its structure before it began operating,
however, when it had difficulty attracting investors. Potential investors
were discouraged from investing by the anonymity of their roles and
preferred to be more involved in running a team.' Under the new
arrangement, MLS retained formal ownership of its franchises but is-
sued a special class of stock to "investor-operators." This special class
of stock gave them "almost full operating control" over the manage-
ment of a particular franchise.' °5 The franchises and the league
equally share local revenues (generated by the teams from ticket sales,
concessions, signage, etc.), while MLS retains all national television
and merchandising revenues. The funds MLS receives are used in
part to pay all player salaries. The investor-operators receive divi-
dends on profits from league operations and may also sell their special
stock to outside groups, just as in traditional leagues. 6 In this new
structure, MLS teams do compete with each other in some of the
same ways noted by the Sullivan court. Thus, the new structure is
clearly a less "pure" single entity than the MLS Rothenberg originally
envisioned, and somewhat more like traditionally organized leagues.0 7
' See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 495-96 (discussing MLS's original de-
sign).
101 See idU (detailing MLS's original structure).
" See supra text accompanying notes 65-68 (discussing the Sullivan decision).
'03 See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 497 (describing the outcome as "almost
certain").
'" See id. at 496 (explaining why MLS initially had problems attracting investors).
5 Id.
"6 See id. at 496 (setting forth the details of MLS's current organization).
107 'Me structures of two other recently formed single entity sports leagues show the
extent to which the structures of single entity leagues can differ. The American Bas-
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There is another extremely important structural difference be-
tween MLS and the traditional leagues, however, which tempers intra-
league competition and thus complicates application of the Sullivan
court's standard to MLS. MLS allows its investor-operators to run
more than one team. In fact, three individual investors manage a to-
tal of seven teams, more than half of the twelve teams currently com-
peting in MLS.' °s The players and coaches selected by the MLS inves-
tor-operators with multiple teams are thus more accurately described
as "allocated" to a particular team. Overall, intraleague competition is
substantially foreclosed because so many teams share common inves-
tor-operators.1'° The prospect of the vigorous off-field competition
found by the Sullivan court is highly unlikely because of the potential
ketball League ("ABL"), which has since suspended operations and declared bank-
ruptcy, originally consisted of eight teams. SeeAmy Shipley, ABL Says It Is Bankrupt and
Shuts Down, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1998, at D1 (reporting the ABL's announcement
that it was suspending operations). Both the players and management of each team
were employed and allocated to individual teams by the league office. In addition, the
players were given a 10% interest in the ABL. See WEI=R & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at
497-98 (describing the ABL's corporate tructure). The Women's National Basketball
Association ("WNBA") could be characterized as a "less pure" single entity than the
ABL. The WNBA LLC (limited liability company) is a corporation owned by NBA De-
velopment, which in turn is owned by the 29 NBA franchises, each of which has differ-
ent owners. See id. at 497 (discussing the WNBA's structure). The NBA teams have
official control of the WNBA, but a board of eight NBA owners and the NBA commis-
sioner sets WNBA policy. The WNBA, like the ABL, hires both players and coaches,
and assigns them to individual teams. The NBA teams who play in the same city as
WNBA teams manage the franchises and receive a share of local revenues generated by
the team. See id. (contrasting the ABL and the WNBA). Since the WNBA players have
chosen to form a union and begin bargaining with WNBA management rather than
pursue litigation like the MLS players, it is unlikely that a decision regarding applica-
tion of section I to the WNBA is imminent. SeeW.H. StickneyJr., WNBA Athletes Vote to
Affiliate with NBA Players' Union, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 6, 1998, at 2 (discussing the
results of the vote certifying the National Basketball Players Association as the WNBA
players' official bargaining representative).
See Michael Hiestand, A Family That Plays Together, USA TODAY, Dec. 2, 1998, at
3C (noting this apparent conflict of interest). Robert Kraft and Lamar Hunt, both of
whom also own NFL franchises, operate two franchises each. See id. (asserting that
three owners control a majority of the franchise's teams). Phillip Anschutz, a part
owner of the NHL's Los Angeles Kings, operates a total of three franchises.
109 This structure also raises the danger that a single investor-operator may attempt
to load one of her teams with all of her best players. As a result, the power of the MLS
Commissioner to block trades (a power each Commissioner also enjoys in the tradi-
tional league model) is especially important in maintaining a competitive balance
throughout the league. See id. (explaining that the MLS Commissioner is "'a final
check and balance' on any owner attempting a shady trade between [her] teams").
Even without this safeguard, it is unlikely that the benefits an owner would accrue from
creating a "loaded" team would outweigh the losses the owner would suffer from the
reduced competitiveness of her other teams.
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for direct harm to the operator's other intraleague interests."0 In ad-
dition, MLS still operates two teams, which further weighs against the
existence of significant intraleague competition."' Thus, the fortunes
of a single MLS team are so inextricably linked to the success of all the
other teams that any argument emphasizing a diversity of interests
among MLS teams seems extremely far-fetched.
C. Fraser v. MLS: The Players' Claims
The league practices at issue in Fraser concern MLS's restraints on
its teams' ability to acquire players. In this area of league operations,
MLS has retained a system very close to the more pure single entity
model originally envisioned by Rothenberg. Once an investor-
operator decides which players she would like to acquire, MLS negoti-
ates a contract with the player. The terms of the agreement are sub-
ject to the league's salary cap and any restraints on player movement,
after the acceptance of which the player becomes an employee of the
league, rather than of the "allocated" team."2 The players allege that
MLS's entire system of player restraints violates the antitrust laws.
First, they argue, the salary cap, the centralized player allocation sys-
tem, and the standard reserve clause in every player contract unrea-
sonably restrict the labor market for professional soccer players in the
United States by preventing MLS teams from competing against each
other for the services of individual players."3 Second, the standard
MLS player contract unlawfully restricts the players' ability to license
their names and images."4 Third, the system of transfer fees promul-
gated by the sport's International Governing Body, FIFA, and en-
forced by the United States Soccer Federation and MLS, violates the
antitrust laws by restricting players' ability to seek employment in
"' See id. ("[T]he idea is ... successful businessmen won't abuse their multiple-
team ownerships and risk undermining the league's credibility because, ultimately,
they're business partners rather than competitors.").
' SeeJill R. Dorson, Clash Swept Up by Kraft Group: San Jose Club Sold AfterRothenberg
Deal Falls Through, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 19, 1998, at D2 (discussing MLS's current own-
ership situation).
" SeeWE1LER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 496-97 (discussing MLS's restrictions on
player contracts).
Is See Sarbjit Singh, Welcome to the Club: Upstart Major League Soccer Gets Sued, 6
SPORTS LAW.J. 217, 229-30 (1999) (discussing players' claims of antitrust violations).
4 See id. at 230 (noting the players' claim that "[the MLS standard player agree-
ment denies players a fair share of group licensing rights").
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other leagues. 5
D. Fraser v. MLS: Assessing the Arguments
In assessing the applicability to MLS of the concerted action re-
quirement of section 1, there are several arguments the Fraser court is
likely to consider.
1. Copperweld Is Controlling
MLS can argue that Fraser is factually indistinguishable from, and
therefore directly controlled by, Copperwelds bright-line rule. As MLS
and its shareholders wholly own the franchises, their intracorporate
decisions, or league rules, cannot be deemed concerted action for sec-
tion 1 purposes, and therefore are not subject to section 1 liability.
MLS can even argue that its organization is a more pure single entity
than the parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary in Cop-
perweld Under this view, MLS's franchises are not subsidiaries of the
league, but more like "plants" where the corporation outputs its
product.
2. "Form vs. Reality" Analysis
The court may decide, however, that the result in Copperweld is not
directly controlling. In that case, the players can argue that the ra-
tionale of Copperweld demands a finding of concerted action. Copper-
weld emphasizes that the concerted action requirement directs courts
to look at the economic reality, rather than the form, of the businessS • 117
association. Permitting MLS to escape section 1 liability similarly
values form over economic reality. From this perspective, the single
entity league has the same purpose, and produces the same basic
product, as the traditionally organized leagues, and therefore should
receive the same treatment under the antitrust laws. The competition
"- See id. (noting the players' transfer fee claim). The transfer fee claims concern
MLS's agreements with another economic entity, FIFA, and thus will not be affected by
MLS's single entity argument.
16 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 756 (1984)
(recounting the Copperweld Corporation's transfer of the Regal Company's assets into
a subsidiary corporation, Regal Tube). After all, MLS consists of only one corporation,
not two, as was the case in CopperwelL
17 In fact, the Court repealed the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in Copperweld
precisely because it "looks to the form of an enterprise's structure and ignores the real-
ity." Id. at 772.
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for coaches and other team personnel among MLS franchises is just
like the off-field intraleague competition in the traditional leagues
that the First Circuit emphasized in Sullivan.0 8
In addition, the nature of the special class of stock owned by the
investor-operators creates incentives for each operator to compete at
the expense of fellow shareholders. The investor-operators keep 50%
of the ticket sales, local broadcast, and local sponsorship revenue gen-
erated by their respective teams, and thus have divergent economic
interests. 9 Furthermore, should the investor-operator choose to sell
her stock, the stock's value will reflect her team's competitive success.
A winning team is likely to encourage greater attendance as well as
generate additional revenue by hosting playoff games. Teams with a
larger fan base and a healthy balance sheet will appreciate in value as
compared to less successful clubs with smaller followings. Although
the financial health of the league as a whole may be as, if not more,
important than the prospects of an individual franchise, the on-field
success or failure of a particular investor-operator's team affects the
return on her investment. This economic reality creates additional
incentives for the investor-operator to compete at the expense of the
rest of the league.
The players' position is problematic, however, in several respects.
First, MLS can dispute the players' characterization of "economic real-
ity." The investor-operators that the players would perceive as inde-
pendent economic actors are merely shareholders in the MLS corpo-
ration. It would be unthinkable in another context for a court to find
concerted action through the actions of the shareholders of a single
corporation. As the Seventh Circuit noted in WGN, simply because a
large corporation like GM may have employees or shareholders with
disparate interests does not mandate characterizing GM as something
other than a single entity.'20 The fact that the interests of shareholders
may diverge under certain circumstances is clearly insufficient to war-
rant a finding of concerted action.
Second, the players' argument is also questionable because courts
addressing the single entity question with respect to traditional
leagues have found that the form of a sports league (an association of
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing Sullivan).
'9 See Singh, supra note 113, at 231 (describing the allocation of MLS revenues).
120 See Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir.
1996) ("WGN') ("Conflicts are endemic in any multi-stage firm... but they do not im-
ply that these large firms mustjustify all of their acts under the Rule of Reason.").
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independently owned businesses) is its economic reality.12' The fact
that the member clubs are independently owned and compete in
some respects has been more persuasive than league arguments em-
phasizing the degree of cooperation undertaken by the member
clubs. By this reasoning, Copperweld could actually be distinguished
from Fraser (to MLS's benefit) because a sports league's unique quali-
ties dictate that its form does matter, and is in fact the defining aspect
of its economic nature. In finding insufficient evidence that the in-
dependently owned franchises acted as a single entity, the court re-
jected arguments concluding that form was irrelevant.1 n Given this
precedent, the Fraser court may be required to accept a sports league's
form as indicative of its status as a single economic entity. Just as the
court in Sullivan refused to look past the divergent interests created by
independent club ownership, the Fraser court could find that the lack
of independent owners is dispositive evidence of a unitary actor. To
find otherwise would seem inconsistent with Sullivan, which, as a First
Circuit opinion, is binding precedent for the District of Massachusetts
Fraser court.
Finally, the players' position is problematic because the Copperweld
court championed the right of business associations to organize them-
selves as they deem appropriate: "[A] business enterprise should be
free to structure itself in ways that serve efficiency of control .... "'
The single entity structure allows MLS numerous efficiencies.'2 4
MLS's freedom to self-organize would be compromised significantly if
courts were free to ignore how a business chose to organize itself, opt-
ing instead to characterize a business as something other than its cho-
sen form.
3. Following WGA. Distinguishing MLS's Operations
As an alternative to the "form vs. economic reality" argument, the
MLS players can use the WGNopinion to distinguish certain aspects of
MLS's operations from its relations with its players, the practices at is-
121 See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that because
"NFL member clubs compete in several ways off the field," they could not be viewed as
a single entity); Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389
(9th Cir. 1984) ("Raides") (finding that the clubs were "separate business entities").
2 See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 (finding that NFL teams have divergent interests).
2 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 (1984).
121 See Lebowitz, supra note 97, at IF (noting the advantages of a single entity
league, including controlling player costs, greater leverage in negotiating broadcasting
contracts, and coordinated marketing strategies that eliminate the problem of ambush
marketing).
BIG LEAGUE PERESTROIKA?
sue in Fraser. According to the Seventh Circuit, it is perfectly permis-
sible to treat a traditionally organized league as a single entity in some
respects and as a joint venture in others.'2 Under this view, even if
MLS is regarded as a single entity in some aspects of its operations,
such as national television and marketing deals, and franchise reloca-
tion and expansion, it should still be treated as ajoint venture in the
player market. The nature of a sports league is such that individual
teams will always compete with one another in the player market. In
order to achieve on-field competitive success, teams must make them-
selves attractive as potential employers to players both within and out-
side of the league. Although MLS is technically responsible for nego-
tiating player salaries and signing the players to employment
contracts,6 it is really the demand of the individual teams for particu-
lar players that triggers league negotiations with those players. The
league, therefore, merely acts as an agent for the teams by handling
contract negotiations. Likewise, in the traditional leagues, the com-
missioner's office must approve all contracts and trades between
teams to ensure that the transactions comply with league rules. This
rule, however, does not render the traditional leagues single entities.
The end result of these labor practices, the Fraser plaintiffs can ar-
gue, is that MLS fails both the First Circuit's and the Eighth Circuit's
.unity of interests" standards, articulated in Sullivan 27 and Mt. Pleas-
ant, 128respectively, as well as the Seventh Circuit's "depriving the mar-
ketplace of independent decision-makers" test, articulated in WGN.2
The competition between teams for players violates the "unity of in-
terests" standard because teams are pursuing disparate interests as
they attempt to attract the best players. MLS also fails the Seventh
Circuit's test because the artificial market constraints imposed by MLS
greatly reduce the autonomy of the individual decision-makers in the
players' market. The market for professional soccer players' services
in the United States would surely benefit from the removal of these
restraints.
MLS can respond to the players' labor market argument by distin-
guishing the Seventh Circuit's decision in WGN. First and foremost,
the WGN holding applies to traditional sports leagues, and not to
'
2
' See WGN, 95 F.3d at 600 ("[T]he ability of sports teams to agree on a TV contract
need not imply an ability to set wages for players.").
12 See supra text accompanying notes 100-107 (discussing MLS's structure).
2 Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099.
"'City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 274-77 (8th Cir.
1988).
1'2 WGN, 95 F.3d at 598-99.
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leagues organized as single corporations. If, instead, WGNis viewed as
directly relevant, MLS can argue that the holding supports its argu-
ment. WGN directs courts to scrutinize carefully the nature and form
130of each challenged aspect of the sports league's practices. When
MLS reorganized itself into a less "pure" single entity, it did not alter
its system of negotiating all contracts with players and retaining com-
plete control over assigning players to a particular team. Even though
investor-operators may request that the league sign a particular player,
the league's control over the process remains so tight that intraleague
competition for players is muted. Although this reality has profoundly
anticompetitive effects in the player market, those effects are not rele-
vant for determining whether concerted action exists.' 31
MLS's player acquisition system is directly analogous to a corpora-
tion that solicits advice from its plant managers before hiring its em-
ployees. If these plant managers receive potentially lucrative compen-
sation bonuses when their plants outperform the other company
plants (as MLS's investor-operators do if their special class of stock
appreciates), the plant managers obviously would lobby the central
hiring office to secure the best employees for a particular plant. It is
also possible that the skills of a particular prospective employee (like
that of a superstar athlete) are so exceptional that the plant managers
would be willing to offer the prospective employee significantly more
compensation than the company is willing to pay. The company's re-
fusal to pay the employee more than what the company budgeted,
however, does not in itself create an antitrust violation. The prospec-
tive employees could argue that the company is "depriving the mar-
ketplace of independent centers of decision-making" by not allowing
the individual plant managers to pay what they believe the employee is
worth. Even so, the courts would likely honor the single corporate
form that the company had adopted and refrain from finding con-
certed action, despite the anticompetitive effect of the company's
practices. MLS's control over the supply of players entering the
league is no different from the company's control over employees in
this corporate example.
The argument against the existence of concerted action is further
strengthened by the fact that more than half of MLS's teams are
"0 See WGN, 95 F.3d at 600 ("[It is essential to investigate [a league's] organization
and ask Copperwelds functional question one league at a time-and perhaps one facet
of a league at a time .. ").
IS, The anticompetitive effects would of course become relevant if concerted action
was found.
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owned by investor-operators who own multiple teams./32 Aside from
the fact that the league would block an investor-operator from doing
so, any efforts by a particular investor-operator controlling multiple
teams to "buy a championship" for one of her teams would inevitably
damage her investment in her other team(s). Thus, for a majority of
teams, reckless spending on players would be counterproductive to
the interests of the free-spending investor-operator, not just the
league as a whole.
The weight of the arguments favors MLS's position. Substituting
the single entity sports league for the traditional model changes such
dispositive characteristics that it becomes illogical to treat a league like
MLS as a collection of economic actors competing in any meaningful
economic sense. Therefore, section 1 of the Sherman Act should not
apply to MLS.
III. THE POSSIBILrIY OF SECION 2 LIABILITY
A legal victory for MLS on the single entity question would only
result in the dismissal of the MLS players' section 1 claim. The players
could still pursue a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act because
section 2 does not have a concerted action requirement.
Section 2 prohibits monopolization and attempted monopoliza-
tion by a single economic actor. 3 The players could allege that MLS's
practices constitute an abuse of the league's monopoly power in the
market for soccer players. Generally, players who have brought anti-
trust claims against leagues have not used section 2 and proving a sec-
tion 2 violation has, in practice, been far more difficult than making a
successful section 1 claim.'34
To make a successful section 2 claim, the MLS players would first
1 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (noting that several MLS owners op-
erate more than one MIS team).
'as See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States... shall be deemed guilty
of a felony....").
"4 SeeJacobs, supra note 30, at 28 n.12 ("[C] hallenges to league activities under sec-
tion 2 have been infrequent and, for a variety of reasons, unsuccessful."). Section 2
cases generally have featured other leagues or franchises as plaintiffs. See, e.g., United
States Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding the
jury's finding that the defendant was guilty of section 2 antitrust violations but liable
for only one dollar); Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 1983) (up-
holding the NFL's refusal to admit a former World Football League franchise into the
NFL); American Football League v. NFL, 323 F.2d 124, 134 (4th Cir. 1963) (failing to
find that the NFL monopolized the relevant market).
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have to show that the relevant product and geographic market is the
labor market for elite professional soccer players in the United
States.Is Assuming arguendo that the players successfully characterize
this labor market as the relevant product market,'3 they will likely
have a much more difficult time proving that the relevant geographic
market is the United States. The players would have to prove that if a
hypothetical monopolist soccer league in the United States were to
impose wage restrictions that depressed wages by a small but signifi-
cant amount (usually 5-10%), players would have no option but to
sign with the monopolist league.' s This argument ignores the fact
that there are many other professional soccer leagues around the
world that offer comparable (and in many cases, superior) competi-
tion and compensation. Although players may prefer to play in an
American league for a variety of reasons, the court may view the avail-
ability of close substitutes to an American league as reason to desig-
nate the world-wide market as the relevant market for the services of
professional soccer players. Because MLS is only one of many top
leagues scattered throughout the world, it falls far short of the 50%
minimum market share generally required to prove market power.3s8
This failure to prove market power would result in dismissal of the
section 2 claim against MLS.39
135 SeeUnited States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) ("The offense of
monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of mo-
nopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a supe-
rior product, business acumen, or historic accident.").
The NFL's repeated attempts to argue that it "faces market competition" from
other professional sports leagues and other forms of entertainment have been re-
jected. WEULER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 603. It is also worth noting that there is
considerable scholarly debate as to whether the antitrust laws (either section 1 or sec-
tion 2) apply to labor markets at all. See id. at 152-53 (noting that because "monop-
sony" power held by the purchaser may merely induce a wealth transfer, and actually
enhance consumer welfare, a buyer's control of the labor market may not be subject to
antitrust scrutiny).
137 See United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 1997) (de-
scribing, but not adopting, the Department of Justice's test for determining the rele-
vant~roduct market).
See Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 489 (5th Cir.
1984) ("Supreme Court cases ... suggest that absent special circumstances, a defen-
dant must have a market share of at least fifty percent before he can be guilty of mo-
nopolization.").
Even if the players' proffered market definition was accepted by the court, they
still might have difficulty proving that MLS abused its market power. The standard for
assessing what constitutes an abuse of monopoly power is the subject of considerable
disagreement. Some circuits have adopted an extremely pro-defendant test that re-
quires the plaintiff to prove that the sole purpose of the conduct at issue was to harm
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The problems of proving both the existence of market power and
the abuse of that power highlight some of the challenges involved in
pursuing a section 2 claim, especially against MLS. These difficulties
only further accentuate the importance of the single entity question-
should MLS prevail on that issue, it likely will be extremely well insu-
lated from any antitrust challenges by its players. 140
IV. A PLAN TO REORGANIZE THE TRADITIONAL LEAGUES
New sports leagues need not be the only leagues to enjoy the
benefits of the single entity structure. Should MLS succeed in arguing
that it is a single entity for antitrust purposes, as this Comment pre-
dicts, the traditional leagues should reorganize themselves along the
MLS (or some similar) corporate model.14' The reorganization plan
set forth in this section modifies a plan proposed by Jeffrey A. Rosen-
the defendant's competition. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 950
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that the defendant's ability to "ascrib[e] facially plausible
benefits to its integrated design" was sufficient to meet its burden of demonstrating the
lack of a violation of an antitrust-based consent decree); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that a monopolist may seek
competitive advantage in a different market as long as it is merely "reaping the com-
petitive rewards attributable to its efficient size"). The Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, allows a showing of "unreasonably exclusionary" conduct, which suggests more
of a balancing approach. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125
F.3d 1195, 1209 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming ajury instruction that declared "unnecessar-
ily exclu [sionary]" conduct by a monopolist illegal).
"0 The players and other parties will be able to sue under section 1, however, for
agreements MIS makes with third parties that violate the Rule of Reason. For exam-
ple, the Fraser plaintiffs have challenged the MIS-FIFA arrangement that requires out-
side leagues to pay transfer fees for the rights to all MLS players, including those whose
contracts with MIS have expired. MIS moved for summaryjudgment on the grounds
that it has not yet enforced its right to demand a transfer fee. The judge, however, de-
nied the motion. See Fraser v. MILS, 7 F. Supp. 2d 73, 75 (D. Mass. 1998) (refusing to
rule that the transfer fee question was moot even though MIS had never requested a
transfer fee).
141 The leagues may also want to wait for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit
split concerning the appropriate standard of liability for section 2 of the Sherman Act.
See supra note 139 (discussing the circuit split). If the Court adopts a defendant-
friendly standard similar to the Second Circuit's Berkey Photo test, it will provide addi-
tional incentive for the leagues to reorganize. 603 F.2d at 276. Conversely, if the
Court were to adopt a more plaintiff-friendly balancing test, like the Ninth Circuit's
"unreasonably exclusionary" standard in Image Technical Services, the difference be-
tween the standards for section 1 and section 2 liability would be less significant. 122
F.3d at 1209. This would decrease the significance of the inapplicability of section 1 to
the reorganized league. Even if the Supreme Court adopts a plaintiff-friendly stan-
dard, however, a section 2 plaintiff would still have to prove that the defendant league
possessed monopoly power, which would be very difficult in many circumstances. See
discussion supra Part III (explaining the difficulties involved in making a successful sec-
tion 2 claim).
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thal in The Football Answer to the Baseball Problem: Can Revenue Sharing
Work in which he attempts to solve an entirely different problem
plaguing one of the traditional leagues: the large disparities in the
economic strength of Major League Baseball's franchises.'
43
A. Big League Perestroika
To begin, I propose that each of the traditional leagues change
their status from an unincorporated association to a limited liability
corporation. The "corporate league" would then buy its franchises
from the owners for the franchises' value, as determined by an inde-
pendent appraiser.14 Any owner who prefers not to continue under
the new corporate system would receive cash for her franchise. Par-
ticipating owners, like MLS investor-operators, would receive two
142 Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The Football Answer to the Baseball Problem. Can Revenue Shar-
ing Work?, 5 SETON HALLJ. SPORT LAW 419 (1995).
4 Rosenthal's proposal included the following:
(1) Have the league "purchase" every team for its appraised value.
(2) "Sell" each team back to its original owner at the estimated
new value after calculating the impact of revenue sharing. For
owners that choose not to re-purchase their teams, solicit outside
bids.
(3) Allow teams that owe money (due to the increased value of
their team) to finance the purchase through future income (but
keep the period of time relatively short to avoid draining available
resources over a long time).
(4) Assume central league control for negotiating all local broad-
casting contracts. Attempt to cross-market by permitting multiple
games to be broadcasted into each market, particularly during the
September pennant races.
(5) Share all national and local broadcasting revenues equally.
(6) Divide gate receipts unequally-a split of approximately 67-33
seems fair (33% should go to the visitor, not the league; this re-
wards good teams who are in demand in other cities). This will en-
sure that a sufficient incentive to win remains.
(7) Attempt to negotiate some form of revenue sharing with play-
ers to avoid potentially decreasing salaries and other potential ex-
ternalities as discussed herein.
(8) Ignore fixed income such as stadium revenues for now, unless
many owners choose to forsake profit-maximizing behavior and
spend this revenue to the disadvantage of teams with less favorable
lease arrangements.
Id. at 466-67.
144 As described in Rosenthal's plan, the franchise values could be adjusted to ac-
count for anticipated changes in particular league rules. For example, baseball might
choose to adopt increased revenue sharing measures, which Rosenthal deemed essen-
tial to the game's economic stability. See id. at 423-28 (discussing the need for revenue
sharing).
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kinds of stock in return for ownership fights to their respective teams.
One class of stock would provide for the traditional voting rights
within the league that all franchise owners currently enjoy, as well as a
share of the league's profits. The other class of stock would grant
control of the day-to-day operations of the individual franchises to
their previous owners and allow the owners to sell this stock to outside
bidders. The franchises themselves could be owned directly by the in-
corporated league or exist as subsidiaries wholly owned by the parent
league corporation, similar to the defendants' arrangement in Copper-
wel 
45
The advantages of the corporate league would be manifold. First
and foremost, the league would not face section 1 liability. Because
almost every aspect of traditional league operations has been chal-
lenged under section 1, leagues necessarily are constrained in adopt-
ing new rules and entering into new arrangements by the constant
threat (if not the certainty) of a section 1 challenge. By removing sec-
tion 1 liability, the leagues would not have to overcome such barriers,
and would also avoid the expense of litigating many lawsuits. Al-
though it is certainly true that claims could still be brought under sec-
tion 2, the difficulty of making such a claim successful will likely deter
many suits. The corporate league would also enjoy increased bargain-
ing leverage over its players, increased sponsorship opportunities,
more efficient decision-making, and improved economies of scale.
B. Potential Problems with the Proposal
The proposed reorganization is admittedly a radical measure that
would fundamentally change the basic structure of each league. The
reorganization would probably raise some significant, but not insur-
mountable, problems. The advantages of the corporate league are so
sizeable, however, that a close examination of the problems facing re-
organization should not overshadow the long term benefits that the
corporate league would enjoy. As one source noted, "[i]f [NFL]
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue could convert the NFL to a single en-
tity, he'd do it tomorrow.
47
Some team owners may be strongly opposed to such a plan be-
cause they derive value from the status their control of a team brings
in the community and amongst other wealthy people. Not surpris-
" Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 756 (1984).
'46 Seesupra Part II.A (discussing the benefits of single entity leagues).
1
47Lebowitz, supra note 97, at IF.
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ingly, MLS had great difficulties attracting investors under its original
plan, which did not provide for the investors to be associated with a
particular team.4 8 The plan essentially would have turned the inves-
tors into anonymous stockholders. MLS quickly realized its mistake
and created a second class of investor-operator stock, which allows an
owner to exercise control over a particular team, and thus achieve the
public visibility that was absent in the league's original plan.'4 9 Owners
in other leagues may also fear that they will lose the ability to run their
teams without interference, as well as the community recognition that
has made sports teams such valuable commodities. By issuing the sec-
ond class of investor-operator stock, however, the reorganized leagues
can ensure that the owners retain the value they derive from the status
value of team ownership. Owners would also appreciate the fact that
the corporate league would be more profitable due to the economic
advantages gained through the change in structure.'-, Greater profit-
ability translates into both higher dividends and higher valuations of
the individual teams, which should cause the second class of stock
held by the owners to appreciate.
On the other hand, the traditional model may provide certain tax
advantages over the single entity model since owners can deduct the
operating losses of their individual franchises.'5' The projected loss of
tax benefits, however, can be figured into the original appraised price
of the franchise. Furthermore, other owners whose franchises regu-
larly recognized annual operating profits may realize tax savings un-
der the single entity plan. Thus, it is likely that any tax considerations
can be handled as an internal league matter, with some owners using
their gains to compensate others for their losses. Moreover, the
dwindling breed of owners who have held franchises for a long time,
do not have sizeable holdings in other businesses, and are concerned
chiefly with estate taxes also should not be negatively affected since
the sale of the teams to the league in exchange for stock would have
no effect on estate taxes. Thus, tax concerns should not prove to be a
significant obstacle to league reorganization.
The players' union, fearing the loss of a section 1 claim as a bar-
gaining chip with the league, may file an unfair labor practice charge
'48 See WEI.ER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 495 (discussing the problems with the
original plan).
19 See id. at 496.
5 See supra Part II.A (discussing the advantages of the corporate structure of the
league).
See I.R.C. § 165(a) (1999) (allowing a deduction for "any loss sustained during
the taxable year").
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claiming that the reorganization must be negotiated with the union.
Although employers are obligated to bargain with unions over
changes "with respect to 'wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment,'' 52 certain aspects of a firm's business are re-
served to the discretion of the firm's management and do not require
bargaining with unions. This includes the manner by which a firm
chooses to organize itself.'O Therefore, a league would not have to
bargain with the union over its decision to reorganize itself.
Additionally, the players or another party, such as the federal gov-
ernment, may also attempt to block the reorganization through anti-
trust law. The single entity question will probably not become a set-
fled matter of law following the disposition of Fraser v. ALLS, unless the
Supreme Court renders ajudgment on the matter. Until that time, a
reorganized league would have to accept a degree of uncertainty that
it may not be deemed a single entity for section 1 purposes.
Concerns about a section 2 claim may limit some of the benefits
reorganization may provide. Section 2 jurisprudence, especially re-
garding labor claims against employers, is so unsettled that the
leagues may be reluctant to risk incurring treble damages by adopting
new restraints in the player market.'5 For section 2 purposes, the tra-
ditional leagues are unlike MLS in that each one is the preeminent
league of its kind in the world. The NFL, for example, has no serious
competition from other football leagues in terms of both the quality
of play and the level of compensation for its athletes. NFL players
pursuing a section 2 claim should be able to define the relevant mar-
ket as that for elite professional football players in the United States,
where the NFL has a complete monopoly."" But even if the players
are successful in showing a single entity league has market power, the
152 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964) (quoting the
National Labor Relations Act).
"" See NLRB v. International Harvester Co., 618 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Man-
agement decisions that fundamentally alter the direction of an enterprise... generally
are not considered decisions concerning terms and conditions of employment and are
not mandatory subjects of bargaining." (citing Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at
223 (StewartJ., concurring))).
114 See supra notes 139, 141 (discussing the circuit split concerning section 2 stan-
dards).
"'The other major leagues-the NIL, the NBA, and MLB-might be able to ar-
gue that international leagues are viable substitutes in the market for each league's
players, but such an argument is unlikely to be successful given the sizable gap in stan-
dards of play and compensation between these North American-based leagues and
other leagues around the world.
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task of proving abuse of market power still remains a difficult one."
Finally, the provisions of section 7 of the Clayton Act might be
used to attack a league's reorganization in a suit brought by the fed-
eral government or the players. Section 7 provides that "[n]o per-
son.., shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
person engaged also in commerce ... where... the effect of such ac-
quisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to cre-
ate a monopoly."157 A union making a section 7 claim would attempt
to characterize the league's action as a merger, rather than a reor-
ganization, which substantially lessens competition in the player mar-
ket. The union's merger claims would be weighed against the familiar
(and heretofore unsuccessful) league claims that it is a single entity,
but also, perhaps more significantly, the Copperweld Court's emphasis
on the freedom of business enterprises to organize themselves as they
see fit.'5 6 In comparison to the traditional league model, the single
entity structure features significant efficiencies which, according to
Copperweld, a business enterprise should be able to realize, free from
government interference.' 59 A section 7 challenge, therefore, is by no
means an insurmountable obstacle for traditional leagues seeking to
enjoy the advantages of a single entity structure.
CONCLUSION
The advent of the single entity sports league may prove to be a vi-
tally important event for the future of professional sports leagues. Al-
though the demise of the American Basketball League"O shows that
single entity leagues are by no means exempt from the cruel eco-
nomic realities of competition in the sports and entertainment mar-
ketplace, the single entity form does provide a structure in which nas-
cent sports leagues may flourish more readily with proper marketing
of its product. Surely a single entity league will be able to avoid some
1'56 See supra note 139 (describing the debate over the appropriate standard for de-
termining abuse of monopoly power).
's 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
' See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 (1984)
("[A] business enterprise should be free to structure itself in ways that serve efficiency
of control, economy of operations, and other factors dictated by business judgment
without increasing its exposure to antitrust liability.").
9 See id. at 772-73 (asserting that a corporation should be able to restructure and
reorganize its operations in order to best serve the corporation's interests, without rais-
ing assumptions of illegitimate motives).
16o See supra note 107 (describing the structure and subsequent bankruptcy of the
American Basketball League).
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of the problems confronted by upstart leagues such as the North
American Soccer League and the United States Football League.'6 '
Both of those leagues were driven into bankruptcy in part by the prof-
ligate ways of its teams in the biggest markets, which relegated smaller
market teams to second class status and diminished the on-field prod-
uct.'6 2 The single entity structure provides a solution to this problem
and thus should make the creation of new sports ventures possible. As
a general policy matter, the single entity form is therefore decidedly
pro-competitive in its effects, and actually encourages the creation of
the labor markets it may subsequently constrain.
The reorganization of the traditional leagues proposed in this
Comment remains strictly a long term possibility. Of course, a favor-
able outcome for MLS in Fraser is necessary. Nevertheless, the leagues
should begin exploring the possibility of reorganization. The contin-
ual threat of section 1 claims has hampered leagues' efforts to maxi-
mize their bargaining leverage with players' unions and exposed the
league to protracted and burdensome litigation with players, owners,
and other leagues. The removal of the section 1 threat and the poten-
tial that the single entity model holds for controlling player costs pro-
vide powerful incentives for leagues to follow MLS's lead and adopt
single entity structures.
"' See Lebowitz, supra note 97, at 1F (contrasting MILS with other upstart leagues,
including the NASL and the USFL).
'
62 See id. ("The NASL situation wasn't much different than the financial disparities
between franchises that killed the United States Football League .... ").
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